Aspirations as reference points: an experimental investigation of risk behavior over time by Arvid O. I. Hoffmann et al.
Theory Dec. (2013) 75:193–210
DOI 10.1007/s11238-012-9323-6
Aspirations as reference points: an experimental
investigation of risk behavior over time
Arvid O. I. Hoffmann · Sam F. Henry ·
Nikos Kalogeras
Published online: 13 July 2012
© The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper examines the importance of aspirations as reference points in
a multi-period decision-making context. After stating their personal aspiration level,
172 individuals made six sequential decisions among risky prospects as part of a
choice experiment. The results show that individuals make different risky-choices in a
multi-period compared to a single-period setting. In particular, individuals’ aspiration
level is their main reference point during the early stages of decision-making, while
their starting status (wealth level at the start of the experiment) becomes the central
reference point during the later stages of their multi-period decision-making.
Keywords Aspirations · Multi-period decision-making · Reference points ·
Risk-behavior · Risky-choice
A. O. I. Hoffmann (B) · S. F. Henry
Department of Finance, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University,
P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
e-mail: a.hoffmann@maastrichtuniversity.nl
A. O. I. Hoffmann
Network for Studies on Pensions, Aging and Retirement (Netspar),
P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
N. Kalogeras
Department of Marketing and Supply Chain Management, School of Business and Economics,
Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
N. Kalogeras
European Center of Corporate Engagement (ECCE), School of Business and Economics,
Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
123
194 A. O. I. Hoffmann et al.
1 Introduction
Risky-choice behavior is often reference-dependent (Sugden 2003; Bleichrodt 2007).
Prior work shows that typical reference points are individuals’ own current wealth or
endowment (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Munro and Sugden 2003). Recent research,
however, suggests that aspiration levels may also serve as reference points (Payne
et al. 1980; Endres 2006; Page et al 2007; Diecidue and Van De Ven 2008). Therefore,
current models of risky-choice start to include multiple reference points, which is
especially relevant in real-life choice contexts with repeated decision-making (Sullivan
and Kida 1995; Liu and Colman 2009).
A key feature of such multi-period decision-making is that individuals may initially
base their decisions on aspiration levels that may or may not coincide with later
reference points. A pioneering model that addresses the role of aspiration levels is
SP/A theory (Lopes 1987). Subsequent studies on reference-dependency show that
reference points can change over time (Lim 1995; Heyman et al. 2005; Munro and
Sugden 2003; Schmidt 2003; Bleichrodt 2007; Arkes et al. 2008). Outcome framing
and the results of preceding decisions, for example, influence a choice’s perceived
riskiness (Weber and Milliman 1997; Cohen et al. 2008) and the basis for evaluating
choices changes as new choice situations occur (Gooding et al. 1996).
Recent extensions on shifting and multiple reference points (including aspirations)
make reference-dependency models more complete and dynamic. Decision-making
under risk over the longer term, however, remains under-examined. This is surprising,
as aspirations are generally defined as goals that cannot be realized in an instant, but
require multiple decisions over time. Dellavigna and LiCalzi (2001) state that there
is a lack of experimental research that examines the evolution of risk-behavior over
time. To better understand how individuals in markets behave when facing repeated
decision-making under risk, there is a need for studies on multi-period decisions (see
e.g., Payne et al. 1980; Ackert et al. 2006).
The current paper contributes to filling this void in the literature and examines the
importance of aspirations as reference points through an experimental elicitation of
decision-maker preferences within a multi-period context. The paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework.
Section 4 describes the methodology and experimental design. Section 5 presents the
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
2.1 Reference-dependence theories
Since prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) challenged the principles of
expected utility theory, reference-dependence theories gained ground. According to
prospect theory, decision-makers evaluate choices in terms of changes in wealth from
a reference point, creating a “loss domain” below and a “gain domain” above the
reference point. Decision-makers are generally risk-averse in the gain and risk-seeking
in the loss domain. Another distinguishing feature of prospect theory is that the utility
function is steeper in the loss than in the gain domain. Moreover, it is concave in the
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gain and convex in the loss domain. A final key aspect of prospect theory is its nonlinear
transformation of the probability scale: Individuals overweight small probabilities and
underweight moderate and high probabilities.
The concept of a reference point is flexible. Heath et al. (1999) claim that goals
serve as reference points and show they can inherit the properties of prospect theory’s
value function. Aspiration levels are also included as reference points in studies on
risky-choice (Diecidue and Van De Ven 2008). A prominent example of such a model
is SP/A theory (Lopes 1987). According to this theory, individuals assess risky-choices
not only in terms of their security and potential aspects, but also for their attractiveness
relative to an aspiration level.
2.2 Shifting and multiple reference points
Evidence on prospect theory suggests that decision-makers adjust their reference
point in response to changes in wealth (Munro and Sugden 2003; Arkes et al. 2008).
Bleichrodt (2007) supports shifting reference points by claiming that real-life choice
behavior is better explained by allowing such shifts. Schmidt (2003) argues in favor of
shifting reference points by stating that preferences between alternatives may change
if the status-quo is varied.
The idea of shifting reference points becomes more complicated with multiple
reference points. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) state that several factors, such as an
individual’s status-quo or aspiration level, may influence the reference point. It remains
unclear, however, whether both the status-quo and aspiration level can simultaneously
function as reference points. Building on this premise, this paper examines how risky-
choice behavior evolves over time in a context with multiple reference points. As
such, we respond to Gooding et al. (1996), who conclude that two assumptions of
prospect theory, namely reference-point stability and the number of reference points,
have escaped empirical examination to date.
2.3 Multi-period decision-making
Aspirations represent outcomes of human decision-making processes. These outcomes
can be part of the indirect opportunity set, as individuals often have to make multiple
decisions to reach their aspirations. Previous work, however, mainly examines single-
choice decisions where reference points are part of the direct opportunity set (Sullivan
and Kida 1995; Heath et al. 1999). Overall, these studies suggest that individuals
choose the alternative that provides them with the highest probability of reaching their
most important reference point, irrespective of whether they “like” the risk of that
alternative (Shefrin and Statman 2000).
Surprisingly, however, empirical research on multi-period decision-making is
scarce (Loewenstein 1988; Rachlin 1990; Loewenstein and Prelec 1991). Most exist-
ing work is theoretical, such as Dellavigna and LiCalzi (2001). In these authors’ model,
individuals show a dual-risk attitude in the short run (i.e., individuals are risk-averse
over gains while they are risk-seeking over losses), but learn to make risk-neutral
choices over the longer run.
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In multi-period decision-making, it is important to consider how prior outcomes
influence individuals’ choices during the course of decision-making. Current decisions
can be evaluated based on both the current choice options and the history of these choice
options. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) state that decision-makers either use a minimal
account and include only the direct consequences of an act or use an inclusive account
where prior outcomes affect choices. With respect to the latter, Thaler and Johnson
(1990) show that individuals take more risk after realizing a gain. Prior losses, however,
make individuals more risk-averse unless the current choice offers the potential to
eliminate the prior loss.
Another challenge is to examine how reference points are updated as a function
of prior outcomes. Whenever one outcome follows another, the consequences of the
second outcome depend on the adaptation of an individual’s reference point to the
first outcome (Arkes et al. 2008). The relative position of the reference point is one
determinant hereof. The importance attached to each reference point is likely adjusted
according to experienced gains or losses.
3 A framework for analyzing aspirations and risk-behavior over time
This paper proposes and tests a conceptual framework in which individuals make
decisions under risk based on their reference point(s), prior outcomes, and a time
constraint (Fig. 1). The starting status (defined as the status-quo at t = 0), the status-
quo at each step of the multi-period decision-making process, and the initially stated
aspiration level may all function as a reference point. The extent to which each of
these reference points is considered depends on the decision-maker. In the experiment
presented in this paper, decision-makers set a fixed aspiration level before starting
their multi-period decision-making. The time constraint is based on the number of
“framework cycles,” which in this paper is six consecutive decisions.
3.1 Hypothesis 1: single-period versus multi-period risk- behavior
A typical assumption in decision-making research is that individuals wish to maxi-
mize their ex-post result, which would generate the highest utility. It is also plausible,
however, that decision-makers wish to minimize the chance of a low ex-post result
instead, thereby preventing a major loss in utility. The latter means, for example, that
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework
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because of loss aversion, most individuals will choose not to play a gamble with a
50–50 % chance of losing or winning 500 Euros. In this example, the individual’s
status-quo functions as a reference point. Yet, in the presence of an aspiration (e.g.,
someone aspires to win at least something), the gamble might be preferred (recall
aspirations as a second choice criterion in SP/A theory). In both cases, individuals
make a single decision. What would happen if the same individuals have to consecu-
tively choose whether or not to gamble several times? Will preferences change? The
following example stresses the importance of making such multiple decisions.
Scenario 1 Imagine you are going to the casino at 21.00 h and that you will stay
until closing time, 22.00 h. In the casino, you can either play games of poker or spend
your time on small horse-racing tournaments. Both a poker game and a horse-racing
tournament last one hour each. Based on the buy-in and the skills of the other players,
the prospect of a poker game looks as follows: (0.8, −125; 0.2, 500). Playing one
horse-racing tournament has the following prospect: (0.5, −50; 0.5, 50). You equally
like poker and horse racing. You would be happy if you could take an extra 100 Euros
back home, but this is not of utmost importance.
Scenario 2 Imagine Scenario 1, but now you are going to the casino at 18.00 h.
In the first scenario, you have to make a single decision, namely to play one poker
game, to play one horse-racing game, or not to play at all. This choice depends on
how you assess the risks attached to each game, how much (dis)utility you assign to
each outcome, and the extent to which your aspiration (take home an extra 100 Euros)
influences you. In the second scenario, you face the same decision. Now, however,
you have the opportunity to sequentially make this decision several times. Will your
choice at 18.00 h in Scenario 2 be the same as the one at 21.00 h in Scenario 1?
After all, in Scenario 2 you will have the possibility to later “correct” the choice you
took at 18.00 h, whatever the outcome of this choice turns out to be. It is here also
important to consider the extent to which the aspiration influences an individual. For
example, if you chose to play a poker game first, and lost, your subsequent decisions
might aim to quickly recover your loss (and even reach your aspiration) by playing
another poker game, which has the riskier prospect. Instead, though, you might choose
to play some horse-racing games to try and recover your loss, thereby taking a more
cautious approach. As yet another option, you might come to peace with your loss and
stop playing. In addition, the probability of reaching a certain reference point changes
over time, as the variance in outcomes shifts. Knowing this might influence decision-
makers in terms of their risk-behavior, even when the status-quo and the prospects
faced remain the same. All in all, individuals likely act differently when making a
single decision versus multiple decisions.
H1 In the presence of an aspiration, individuals’ single-period risk- behavior differs
from their multi-period risk-behavior.
3.2 Hypothesis 2: relative importance of reference points
The extent to which aspirations influence decision-makers’ choices depends on their
relative importance compared to other possible reference points. In the aforementioned
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Fig. 2 The value function with multiple reference points
scenarios, the starting status is the amount of money taken to the casino. The status-
quo after losing a poker game is this amount minus 125 Euros. The aspiration in this
scenario is the initial amount of money plus 100 Euros. In prospect theory, the starting
status often serves as a reference point and receives special attention, since falling
below this point is perceived as a loss, while exceeding it as a gain. A decision-maker,
however, may consider the aspiration of winning an extra 100 Euros similarly, namely
that not reaching this aspiration constitutes a loss, while reaching or exceeding it a gain.
Hence, the relative importance of both reference points determines the degree of risk-
taking. Recall that decision-makers generally become risk-seeking when positioned
below a reference point and risk-averse when positioned above it. In the presence of
two reference points, the value function of prospect theory can thus be depicted as in
Fig. 2. When the starting status and aspiration level receive equal attention, decision-
makers are expected to show a mixture of risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior when
they are positioned between both reference points (see e.g., Sullivan and Kida 1995).
Revisiting the prior scenarios, an aspiration of taking home an extra 100 Euros could
be reached in the single-period decision context (Scenario 1). It can also be reached in
the multi-period decision context (Scenario 2). An aspiration of taking home more than
an extra 500 Euros, however, can only be reached in Scenario 2. The starting status as
a reference point can be reached in any scenario by not playing at all. Individuals who
worry more about going home with less money than they came with than about reaching
their aspirations are expected to act in a risk-averse manner because of loss aversion
and the starting status acting as the main reference point. In contrast, individuals for
whom only the aspiration matters are expected to become risk-seeking, because they
are positioned in the loss domain of the value function. Finally, individuals focusing
on both the starting status and the aspiration are expected to exhibit a mixture of
risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior, depending on their position. In a multi-period
decision context, the latter case is especially interesting.
Let’s first focus on aspirations as reference points in a multi-period setting. Recall
that an aspiration is usually part of an individual’s indirect opportunity set, something
which can only be reached by making multiple decisions over a longer time period.
During this repeated decision-making, individuals will now and then reflect on their
status-quo to check whether their aspiration is still reachable with the current strategy
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or whether more or less risk needs to be taken in subsequent decisions. This evaluation
is important, as it makes individuals recalculate their chances, which can change
their risk-behavior. For example, individuals become more risk-averse the more they
evaluate past outcomes (Gneezy and Potters 1997). In this discussion, time constraints
are critical: If individuals notice they have a low chance of reaching their aspiration
given that only a few decisions are left, they might not take big chances and still try
to reach it, but act carefully and lower their aspiration to a realistic level.
Now consider the situation where many decisions can still be made (i.e., in the early
stages of a multi-period decision-making context). In this situation, decision-makers
may feel relatively optimistic because several opportunities to reach their aspiration
still exist. This reasoning is strengthened by the anticipation effect (Loewenstein 1987),
according to which the delayed “consumption” of a desire (i.e., reaching the aspiration)
creates additional utility. Also, during the early stages, little reflection has taken place
that could have attenuated this optimism (see Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Gneezy and
Potters 1997; Zeisberger et al. 2012).
By including the starting status as the second reference point in the previous dis-
cussion, the time constraint becomes even more important. Recall the situation where
several decisions can still be made. As previously indicated, the aspiration will likely
receive considerable attention at this point. At the same time, the starting status will
receive attention because in the early stages the distance to this point is still relatively
small. Furthermore, the starting status is considered as a result of individuals’ aversion
to losses. Loss aversion might be weakened during the early stages, however, as there
is still time for corrective actions during later stages. Also, the anticipated additional
utility that reaching the aspiration gives dominates the disutility that losses create.
Diecidue and Van De Ven (2008) argue that continuity of the utility function is not
satisfied at the aspiration level. Rather, outcomes resulting in reaching or exceeding
the aspiration level receive more weight.
In the other situation, where the time constraint is approaching and only a few deci-
sions can still be made, the starting status will receive more attention. This may happen
because of the evaluation of remaining opportunities and the increased emphasis on
the aversion to losses: There is no time left for corrective actions. For most decision-
makers, this “all or nothing” situation is dominated by a concern about ending up with
nothing. This argumentation is supported by the status-quo bias, according to which
decision-makers disproportionately stick to the status-quo instead of opting for a risky
alternative because of loss aversion (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Thus, during
the later stages of multi-period decision-making, the starting status is expected to act
as (an additional) main reference point.
H2 In the context of multi-period decision-making under risk, the aspiration level
will act as main reference point during the early stages of decision-making, while the
starting status becomes an important reference point during the later stages.
3.3 Hypothesis 3: influence of prior outcomes
Several studies show the influence of prior outcomes on individuals’ risk-behavior.
Thaler and Johnson (1990) and Sullivan and Kida (1995), for example, indicate that
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individuals are generally more willing to take risks after a realized gain (the “house-
money effect”) and less willing to take risks after a realized loss. Weber and Zuchel
(2005) provide similar findings. In general, individual decision-makers’ strategies
are subject to change when outcomes are realized. Yet, it remains unclear how prior
outcomes influence risky decision-making in a multi-period decision-making context
with aspiration levels. Here, we develop hypotheses on how prior outcomes impact
subsequent risk-taking behavior given such contextual features.
With respect to experiencing one prior gain in the early stages of a multi-period
decision-making setting, individuals are expected to subsequently take less risky
actions, because the aspiration level is closer and enough decisions are left to be
made: The potential to reach the aspiration is strong and the necessity of taking risks
decreases. Indeed, Denrell (2004) claims that risk-taking is a decreasing function of
the performance–aspiration gap.
In the case of having experienced one prior loss, the findings of Thaler and Johnson
(1990) suggest that decision-makers would become more risk- averse, unless the prior
loss can be eliminated (the “get-evenitis effect”). The get-evenitis effect is important to
consider in a multi-period setting, because the possibility to get even increases when
more time and decision opportunities are available. Therefore, especially during the
early stages, a prior loss is expected to induce more risk-averse behavior, because it
is not necessary to immediately recoup the loss. More risk-averse behavior can also
be expected because of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler 1995), according
to which decision-makers’ concern with short-term losses prevents them from taking
the risks necessary to reach long-term goals. When decision-makers experience two
consecutive prior losses, they will become more risk-averse, primarily for the reasons
outlined for the case of one prior loss. Other factors driving a change to risk-averse
behavior are the performance–aspiration gap and evaluation of past outcomes (Gneezy
and Potters 1997). In case of two prior losses, individuals may stop focusing on their
(too ambitious) aspiration and adapt to risk-averse behavior because of a newly set,
but lower, target in combination with reflecting upon more prior evaluations.
Regarding two consecutive prior gains, we expect that the aforementioned house-
money effect will play an important role. Decision-makers are likely to take riskier
actions, because the potential to reach the aspiration is perceived to be strong, so that
the possibility of a little downfall in wealth might become acceptable (the two prior
gains cushion a subsequent loss).
H3 In the context of multi-period decision-making under risk with aspiration levels,
prior gains and losses influence subsequent behavior as follows: (a/b) one prior gain or
loss induces more risk-averse behavior, (c) two prior gains induce more risk-seeking
behavior, and (d) two prior losses induce more risk-averse behavior.
4 Materials and methods
4.1 Subjects, instructions, and procedure
In exchange for partial course credit, 217 Dutch undergraduate students participated in
an experiment. The experiment was conducted in a university lab containing identical
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cubicles, each supplied with a PC. After reading the instructions and answering sev-
eral questions, subjects were briefed that the remainder of the experiment would be
performed using the PC. Subjects were presented with the same instructions and used
the same experimental program.
4.1.1 Set of instructions
Page one of the instructions described the experiment and informed subjects that they
could win a monetary reward. Page two instructed subjects to imagine the following
situation:
You have planned to go to the casino for ‘3 hours’ in order to (try to) win money.
The amount of money you take with you is 100 Euros. You are a big fan of slot
machines, but there are 3 different kinds. After every ‘30 minutes’ you decide
between either switching to another slot machine or staying at the one you are
playing. So, in total you will make 6 subsequent decisions. After every ‘30
minutes,’ you will know what you won or lost. Find below the descriptions of
the possible outcomes and their probabilities at the 3 slot machines. You do not
have to make any decisions yet.
– Slot Machine A: (45%, 40; 10%, 0; 45%, −40)
– Slot Machine B: (50%, 30; 10%, 0; 40%, −30)
– Slot Machine C: (60%, 15; 10%, 0; 30%, −15)
– Fourth option: Every “30 minutes” of not playing gives 3 Euros from your
parents.
The prospects of the slot machines were explained, and it was explicitly stated that slot
machine A is the riskiest one, machine B a bit less risky, and machine C the least risky.
Page three contained questions to test subjects’ comprehension of the information on
the second page and stressed that the outcomes of their decisions on the computer were
not controlled by the researchers, but random. Page four measured several descriptive
background variables.
4.1.2 Computer program
After subjects finished reading the set of instructions, a computer program was run in
full screen on their PCs. This part of the experiment was programmed and conducted
with the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The program was divided
into two parts: In Part I, subjects had to make their decisions, in Part II, a short
questionnaire was presented.
Part I. First, subjects had to state their aspiration level, that is, the total amount of
money they would like to have at the end (after the ”3 h”). Letting subjects state
their own aspiration level increases their involvement and makes it more likely that
they convey their true disposition towards their aspiration in the decision context
at hand. After stating their aspiration level, the reward description appeared on the
screen, explaining subjects’ chance of winning the monetary reward (see Sect. 4.4,
Incentive scheme). It was checked whether each subject read the reward description
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Fig. 3 Input/output structure of the experiment
by identifying the amount of time subjects stayed on this screen. Next, subjects had to
make their first decision. The outcome of this decision was shown on the next screen,
together with their starting status (i.e., 100 Euros), updated status-quo, and stated
aspiration level. Figure 3 depicts the input/output structure of the program.
Part II. After subjects finished making their decisions, a questionnaire was started
that probed their satisfaction, happiness, and regret for their decisions with respect to
the final result (total amount of money after ”3 h”). Their age and gender were also
collected.
4.2 Manipulation
To investigate the differences in risk-behavior among different situations, it was nec-
essary to randomize the outcomes of subjects’ decisions such that each situation of
interest received an adequate sample size. An often-chosen option here is to manip-
ulate the outcomes a priori by setting, for example, a gain path versus a loss path
(see e.g., Heyman et al. 2005). To ensure the integrity of the university’s research
lab and avoid subject deception, however, in this study all paths were determined
by a random-number generator. That is, researchers did not control the outcomes of
subjects’ decisions. Each subject had his/her own unique path.
4.3 Incentive scheme
To extract true risk preferences, individuals must be confronted with a goal-based
incentive scheme (Itami 1976). Without incentives, individuals might become unin-
volved, act carelessly, and not make decisions congruent with their real predisposition
towards risk. In this paper’s experiment, the incentive scheme is set-up to elicit neither
overall conservatism nor carelessness, but subjects’ natural preferences and behavior.
Subjects were informed that five of their names would be randomly drawn after the
experiment was completed, and those individuals would receive in cash the money
they had won with their decision-making.
4.4 Data screening
Prior to the analyses, the experimental data were screened for consistency and cor-
rectness. First, we checked whether the computer program generated the right output.
No errors occurred because the outcomes after subjects chose slot machine A were
40, 0, or −40, and nothing else. The same screening was done for slot machines B and
C, and the parent option. Second, we checked whether subjects’ perceived riskiness
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of the slot machines was in line with the experiment’s instructions, namely, that slot
machine A is the riskiest machine, C the least risky, and B in between. Thirty-two
subjects (15 %) responded in an inconsistent manner and were excluded from fur-
ther analysis. Third, we checked whether subjects’ aspiration level was above the
starting status, which would be in line with the assumption that decision-makers gen-
erally want to perform above their current level. Thirteen subjects for which this was
not the case were excluded. In the end, 172 subjects remained for further investiga-
tion.
4.5 Pre-test and manipulation check
We conducted a pre-test to check whether individuals perceived the prospect of slot
machine A as riskier than that of slot machine B, and the prospect of slot machine B
as riskier than that of slot machine C. If so, choosing slot machine A can be taken as
risk-seeking behavior and choosing slot machine B or C as risk-averse behavior. The
pre-test also intended to determine an appropriate starting status to increase subjects’
involvement in the experiment.
Thirty students, who did not participate in the main experiment, had to indicate on
a scale from 1 to 10 how risky they perceived the following prospects:
A: (45 %, 50; 10 %, 0; 45 %, −50)
B: (50 %, 50; 10 %, 0; 40 %, −50)
C: (60 %, 50; 10 %, 0; 30 %, −50)
Note that the percentages are similar to those of the prospects of slot machines A, B,
and C, respectively, while the absolute values are constant. In addition, 41 students
had to indicate, on a scale from 1 to 5, to what extent they agreed with the following
statements:
The chance of winning or losing 30 Euros is riskier than the chance of winning
or losing 50 Euros.
The chance of winning or losing 30 Euros is riskier than the chance of winning
or losing 15 Euros.
Note that the absolute values are different, while the chances remain the same. The
results of the three prospects indicate that the higher the chance of winning, the lower
the perceived riskiness (ANOVA results: M(A) = 5.70; M(B) = 4.63; M(C) = 3.77, p
values, .03 and. 09, respectively). The results of the two statements suggest that the
chance of winning or losing a higher amount is seen as riskier than the same chance
of winning or losing a smaller amount (test-value = 3; p < .001 and p = .113,
respectively). Taking these results together, choosing slot machine A represents the
most risk-seeking behavior, choosing slot machine B medium risk-seeking behav-
ior, and choosing slot machine C the least risk-seeking behavior. Individuals also
were asked how much money they would take to a casino when the intention is to
win money. Because 50 and 100 Euros were the first two modes and the mean was
71, 100 Euros was considered an appropriate starting status for this study’s experi-
ment.
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5 Results
5.1 Single versus multi-period risk-behavior
To test for differences between multi- and single-period risk- behavior (H1), we com-
pare subjects’ decisions made at t = 5 to the decisions they made at t = 0, 1, 2, 3, and
4. Decisions made at t = 5 represent single-period decisions, because at this stage
subjects cannot make subsequent decisions: These decisions are one-shot gambles.
To test H1, choosing slot machine A or B is regarded as risk-seeking behavior, while
choosing slot machine C or the parent option is seen as risk-averse behavior, splitting
the dependent variable into two groups.
The results regarding single-period risk-behavior as presented in Table 1 are con-
sistent with general findings of prospect theory and Sullivan and Kida (1995). That
is, the majority of subjects whose wealth is above the aspiration level (Group Above)
exhibit risk-averse behavior (χ2 = 28.446, p < .000), while subjects whose wealth
is between the starting status and aspiration level (Group Between) show a mixture of
risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior (χ2 = 4.091, p = .043), and subjects whose
wealth is below their starting status (Group Below) display risk-seeking behavior
(χ2 = 12.600, p < .000). Importantly, we find different results for the multi-period
decisions as compared to the single-period risk- behavior. For Group Above at t =
1, 2, and 4, no significant differences in risk-behavior are found, while for Group
Between the results are widely dispersed across different t’s, and for Group Below
there are no significant differences in risk-behavior at t = 2. Overall, the empiri-
cal differences found in individuals’ single-period versus multi-period risk-behavior
support H1.
Table 1 Single-period and
multi-period risk behavior
Total number of subjects
choosing a risk-averse (slot
machine C or the parent option)
versus a risk-seeking (slot




at the 1 % level (χ2 test,
.5 proportions)
b Significant difference
at the 5 % level (χ2 test,
.5 proportions)
Group Below Group Between Group Above
t = 1 (D2)
Risk-averse 23 (31.9) 28 (36.4) 3 (75.0)
Risk-seeking 49 (68.1)a 49 (63.6)b 1 (25.0)
t = 2 (D3)
Risk-averse 29 (46.0) 22 (34.9) 8 (57.1)
Risk-seeking 34 (54.0) 41 (65.1)b 6 (42.9)
t = 3 (D4)
Risk-averse 21 (31.8) 22 (33.3) 15 (75.0)
Risk-seeking 45 (68.2)a 44 (66.7)a 5 (25.0)b
t = 4 (D5)
Risk-averse 19 (28.8) 28 (44.4) 18 (64.3)
Risk-seeking 47 (71.2)a 35 (55.6) 10 (35.7)
t = 5 (D6)
Risk-averse 11 (16.9) 20 (36.4) 28 (80.0)
Risk-seeking 54 (83.1)a 35 (63.6)b 7 (20.0)a
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Table 2 Relative importance of reference points
ANOVA Group Below Group Between Group Above
t = 1 (D2) F = 3.098 N 72 77 4
p value = .048 Mean 3.01 2.83 2.00
p value .396 .144
t = 2 (D3) F = 3.166 N 63 63 14
p value = .045 Mean 2.80 3.02 2.45
p value .400 .042
t = 3 (D4) F = 10.277 N 66 66 20
p value = .000 Mean 3.00 2.86 2.00
p value .643 .000
t = 4 (D5) F = 10.285 N 66 63 28
p value = .000 Mean 3.10 2.75 2.22
p value .063 .020
t = 5 (D6) F = 31.746 N 65 55 35
p value = .000 Mean 3.32 2.93 1.86
p value .041 .000
Means of subjects’ decisions (risk behavior)
5.2 Reference point shifting
To test H2, the implications of the value function in Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
prospect theory are used to determine the relative importance that subjects attach to
their starting status and aspiration level as reference points, respectively. For each
t , subjects are divided into the same groups as before, namely Group Below, Group
Between, and Group Above. Since, we hypothesized that the aspiration level acts as
main reference point during the early stages of multi-period decision-making, risk-
seeking behavior is expected for Group Below and Group Between, while Group Above
is expected to show risk-averse behavior. This expectation is based on the fact that
the former two groups are positioned in the loss domain of the value function, while
the latter group is positioned in the gain domain. Over time, however, our expectation
according to H2 is that the starting status becomes a more important reference point.
Thus, during later stages of multi-period decision-making, it is expected that Group
Below will still exhibit risk-seeking behavior, while Group Between will now display
a mixture of risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior, and Group Above will continue to
show risk-averse behavior. This is because for the Group Between, the starting status
and aspiration work together to create a loss/gain domain mix (see Fig. 2).
We conduct five one-way between-group ANOVAs on risk-behavior to explore
the relative importance of both reference points over time. In general, we find that
Group Below displays the riskiest behavior and Group Above the least risky behavior,
whereas Group Between occupies the middle position in terms of risk-behavior. More
interesting, however, are the statistical significant differences found among the three
groups (see Table 2). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey–HSD test indicate that
the mean risk-behavior scores for Group Below do not significantly differ from Group
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Table 3 Relative importance of
reference points when the
aspiration is unreachable
(descriptives)
R Group Reachable, U Group
Unreachable
Distance to aspiration level
>120 81–120 41–80 1–40 ≤0
t = 0 (D1) Unknown R R R R
t = 1 (D2) Unknown R R R R
t = 2 (D3) Unknown R R R R
t = 3 (D4) U R R R R
t = 4 (D5) U U R R R
t = 5 (D6) U U U R R
Table 4 Relative importance of
reference points when the
aspiration is unreachable
(analysis)
Means of subjects’ decisions
(risk behavior)
The subset of subjects used for
this analysis is Group Between
t statistic Group Group
Reachable Unreachable
t = 3 (D4) −2.085 N 52 14
Mean 2.75 3.29
p value .041
t = 4 (D5) −2.258 N 39 24
Mean 2.56 3.04
p value .028
t = 5 (D6) −.245 N 17 38
Mean 2.88 2.95
p value .807
Between at t = 1, 2, and 3, but do significantly differ at t = 4 and 5, with Group
Between showing less risk-seeking behavior. Furthermore, the post-hoc comparisons
show significant differences on risk- behavior scores between Group Between and
Group Above at all t’s, except t = 1 (because of the small sample size). These findings
support the proposed trend of H2, namely that the aspiration level is the main reference
point at the beginning of multi-period decision-making, whereas the starting status
becomes more important at the later stages of multi-period decision-making.
To generate a more detailed insight into these results, we examine whether the
proposed shifts in reference points are more pronounced for subjects that become
unable to reach their aspiration level. It could be expected, that these individuals in
particular will set a new, and lower, reference point (i.e., their starting status) to avoid
the disutility attached to a situation where (over a longer time period) an aspired goal
is just not reached. That is, when positioned in Group Between, we would expect
this subset of subjects (labeled Group Unreachable) to display less risky behavior
compared to the remaining set of subjects who are still able to reach their aspiration
level (labeled Group Reachable). Moreover, we expect Group Unreachable to display a
lower utility with the final outcome (measured as the average of a subject’s satisfaction,
happiness, and regret with the final outcome of the choice experiment).
Independent-samples t tests at t = 3, 4, and 5 examine the differences in risk-
behavior and utility between Group Reachable and Group Unreachable when posi-
tioned in Group Between (Table 3 explains group compositions). Surprisingly,
Group Unreachable exhibits significantly more risky behavior than Group Reachable
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Table 5 Prior outcomes and
risk behavior Scenario
L LL G GG
N 72 29 83 42
Mean
Previous decision 3.04 3.31 3.04 2.81
Current decision 3.01 2.69 2.77 3.10
t statistic .228 2.768 2.688 −1.909
p value .820 .010 .009 .063
(Table 4). This finding contradicts the expectation that for these subjects the start-
ing status becomes a more important reference point. Apparently, individuals react
strongly in terms of risk-taking to losing the aspiration out of the opportunity set.
This reaction could result from disappointment, anger, or lack of care (Shefrin 2002).
This explanation is consistent with untabulated utility findings which show that Group
Unreachable displays a significantly lower utility than Group Reachable.
5.3 Prior outcomes and risk-behavior
To examine the influence of prior outcomes on subjects’ risk- behavior (H3), we create
four scenarios: L, LL, G, and GG. Scenario L means a subject encountered one prior
loss, scenario LL represents two consecutive prior losses. Scenario G stands for one
prior gain, scenario GG for two consecutive prior gains. For scenarios L and G, subjects
were categorized at t = 1 (i.e., at the second decision moment), and for scenarios LL
and GG they were categorized at t = 2 (i.e., at the third decision moment). For each
scenario, we check whether subjects take more or less risk compared to their prior
decision. To do so, a repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted for each scenario
with risk- behavior as within-subjects factor (see Table 5).
Regarding the loss scenarios, we observe no significant difference in risk-behavior
in scenario L (M = 3.04 vs. 3.01, p value = .820), but we do observe a significant shift
in risk-behavior in scenario LL, where more risk-averse behavior is shown compared
to the previous decision (M = 3.31 vs. 2.69, p value = .010). These findings support
H3d but not H3a. Apparently, losing once does not entice subjects to become less risk-
seeking, but losing twice does (cf. Odean et al. 2005). In line with our predictions,
the further an individual (over time) moves away from his or her aspiration level, the
stronger the shift towards risk-averse behavior becomes.
For the two gain scenarios (G and GG), we find significant differences in risk-
behavior. In scenario G, less risk-seeking behavior is observed compared to the previ-
ous decision (M = 3.04 vs. 2.77, p value = .009). This finding contradicts Sullivan
and Kida (1995), who found that more risk-taking behavior is observed in the pres-
ence of prior gains as compared to prior losses, but supports Denrell (2004), who
claims risk-taking is a decreasing function of the performance–aspiration gap. Con-
trary to scenario G, the results of scenario GG suggest that individuals become more
risk-seeking after having experienced gains twice, as predicted (M = 2.81 vs. 3.10,
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p value=.063). All in all, the results support H3b and H3cand show that individuals
become more cautious after experiencing one gain to secure it, but feel that they can
allow themselves to take more risk when prior gains become large enough.
6 Conclusion
This study contributes to the scant experimental evidence on the evolution of risk-
behavior in a multi-period decision context. In particular, we respond to Shefrin and
Statman (2000) call for the development of a multi-period model to examine the link
between risk-behavior and aspirations. This paper is amongst the first to integrate into
one study the ideas of shifting and multiple reference points, multi-period decision-
making under risk, and aspiration levels.
The results of this paper are promising in several ways. First, they demonstrate
that a multi-period feature is important to better understand and predict individuals’
risk-behavior. Second, the results indicate that aspiration levels act as main reference
point during the early stages of decision-making, whereas the starting status becomes
an important reference point during later stages. Third, the results show how prior
outcomes influence subsequent choices.
The set-up of our experiment has some limitations that provide avenues for future
research. First, subjects could not learn about the gambling game beforehand. There-
fore, one may be concerned whether the results reflect deliberate choice or confusion
(Weber and Zuchel 2005). We minimized this concern by encouraging subjects to
ask for clarification. Second, the aspiration level is self-reported. Theory and empir-
ical research suggest that self-report measures represent a mixture of sociological,
psychological, contextual, and experiential effects (Harrison et al. 1996; Lanyon and
Goodstein 1997). Still, for constructs like values and attitudes, self-report is consid-
ered superior, as the subject’s commitment to a self-set aspiration level increases the
reliability of their risk-taking behavior (Howard 1994). Third, offering subjects the
parent option could alter their risk preferences. This is because of the status-quo bias,
which provides an opportunity to remain (roughly) at the current (wealth) position
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Fourth, the current study did not assess the impact
of personality characteristics and situational factors such as stress that might cause
differences in individuals’ risk-behavior over time (see e.g., Porcelli and Delgado
2009).
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